



## Supporting Information for

### Declining Chinese Attitudes toward the United States amid COVID-19

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## **Supplementary Materials 1: SAQURR Survey Data**

In Study 1, we analyze data from three survey series to depict trends in favorability toward the US. The first dataset comes from the most recent wave (2019–2020) of the Social Attitudes Questionnaire of Urban and Rural Residents (SAQURR), a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted in China by the Institute of Psychology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (1). This survey employed stratified, multi-stage, random sampling methods and was administered through face-to-face interviews.

The survey initially selected three regions from seven economic-geographic regions in China: Northeast China, Northwest China, and South China. Within each region, 1–2 provinces were randomly chosen: Liaoning for Northeast China, Shaanxi and Gansu for Northwest China, and Hubei and Guangdong for South China. Further stratification was based on GDP per capita, resulting in four levels. As a result, 3–7 counties or districts were then randomly selected from each level, totaling 85 counties and districts.

In each selected county or district, 40 families were selected, maintaining a 2:1 ratio between rural and urban respondents to match the actual urban–rural distribution in census data. One adult member from each family was interviewed, resulting in a final sample size of 3,408 for this analysis.

Data collection began in December 2019 but was suspended from late January to March 2020 due to the COVID-19 outbreak in China. At the time of the survey’s

suspension, data collection in Northeast and South China was complete, but only 46% of the data in Northwest China had been collected. The remaining half of the data collection in Northwest China resumed and was completed in April 2020.

We use data from SAQURR in two ways. First, in Study 1, we treat the two parts of the SAQURR as two waves and estimate the national average favorability toward the US in December 2019 and April 2020. Specifically, we estimate the pre-pandemic favorability using data from individuals interviewed in late 2019 (N=2,508). It is important to note that this sample does not fully represent Northwest China due to incomplete data collection in the region up to that point.

To estimate the favorability score in April 2020, imputation is necessary because respondents interviewed in 2020 were all limited to Northwest China (N=900), and there was a significant difference in favorability toward the US between Northwest China and other regions in 2019. For imputation, we assume parallel trends between 2019 and 2020 across regions in China. Under this assumption, we impute the favorability score in 2020 for the SAQURR respondents interviewed in late 2019 and estimate the national average using both the actual and imputed data. To estimate the national average favorability scores in December 2019 and April 2020, we apply weights to improve the sample representativeness of the SAQURR. More details about the weighting procedure in Study 1 are provided in Supplementary Materials 4.

Second, in Study 3, we treat the COVID-19 pandemic as a treatment in a quasi-experiment within the Northwest China sample. This approach enables us to

examine changes in attitudes before and after the pandemic in that specific region.

Essentially, we consider the sample interviewed before the COVID-19 outbreak as the control (or pre-treatment) group (N=980) and the sample interviewed after the COVID-19 outbreak as the treatment (or post-treatment) group (N=900) (2). Due to the unpredictable nature of the pandemic outbreak, assignment to the control or treatment group can be considered as random.

Table S1 demonstrates the covariate balance across the control and treatment groups on a number of different time-invariant demographic factors, including sex, age group, and level of education. As is shown in Table S1, the sample from the control group and the treatment group is balanced across all three demographic dimensions.

The SAQURR surveyed respondents to gather their opinions on life, work, government, social issues, and other countries. As for our research interest in Chinese attitudes towards the US, the questionnaire asks: “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the following countries or regions?” The numerals 1 to 4 indicate the following: 1 for “very unfavorable,” 2 for “somewhat unfavorable,” 3 for “somewhat favorable,” and 4 for “very favorable.”

The US 1—2—3—4

India 1—2—3—4

Japan 1—2—3—4

Germany 1—2—3—4

Tanzania (An African country) 1—2—3—4

Pakistan 1—2—3—4

China 1—2—3—4

Hong Kong (China) 1—2—3—4

In the survey, the order of countries/regions was randomized. We recorded the answers so that 0 indicates “very unfavorable” and 3 indicates “very favorable.” At the end section of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to provide demographic information including the year of birth, sex, education level, etc. The relevant section of the SAQURR questionnaire is presented in Supplementary Materials 8 (translated into English) and Supplementary Materials 9 (in original Chinese). The survey data, along with the questionnaire, are accessible at Princeton DataSpace (<https://doi.org/10.34770/ew2y-jy92>) and Yu Xie’s website (<https://yuxie.scholar.princeton.edu/share-files/data-files-declining-chinese-attitudes-toward-united-states-amidst-covid-19>).

Table S1. Demographic Composition across the Control and Treatment Groups

	Control (Pre- treatment)	Treatment (Post- treatment)	Difference	<i>p</i> -value
<b>Sex</b>				
Male	49.49%	50.89%	-1.40%	0.5447
<b>Age</b>				
18–29	35.61%	34.67%	0.95%	0.6682
30–39	18.16%	19.33%	-1.17%	0.5162
40–49	14.18%	16.44%	-2.26%	0.1735
50+	32.04%	29.56%	2.49%	0.2441
<b>Education Level</b>				
Less than high school	27.65%	25.67%	-0.29%	0.331
High school	27.65%	26.11%	1.54%	0.4517
Junior college	19.59%	22.67%	-3.07%	0.1025
BA or higher	25.10%	25.56%	-0.45%	0.8214

## **Supplementary Materials 2: CMWS Survey Data**

The second survey dataset we use for Study 1 is the COVID-19 Multi-Wave Study (CMWS), an online longitudinal survey that covers all 31 provinces in mainland China. This survey collected respondents' information about their health, work, family, and social attitudes during the COVID-19 pandemic (3). CMWS focused on the social consequences during the initial surge of COVID-19 cases in 2020, with an oversampling of residents from Hubei (the initial epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic in China) and a supplementary sample of residents from Beijing, the capital of China. To ensure sample diversity, quotas were established based on sex, age, and education.

The CMWS survey was conducted by the Population Development Studies Center at Renmin University of China, with participants recruited from various online and offline venues by a professional surveying firm. Because the sample was a convenience sample rather than a probability sample, calculating a response rate is challenging. This is because, in convenience samples, it is difficult to estimate the denominator—the people who were exposed to and qualified for the survey.

To maintain data quality, we implemented measures to protect against bots and prevent duplicate completions. We also used attention-check questions and additional verification strategies, including ensuring consistency between reported age groups and birth years.

The baseline wave (Wave 1) was conducted from March to April 2020, and follow-up surveys were conducted from June to July 2020 (Wave 2), November to December 2020 (Wave 3), April to May 2021 (Wave 4), October to December 2021 (Wave 5), and August to October 2022 (Wave 6). The adjacent-wave follow-up rates, representing the proportion of completed surveys relative to those completed from the preceding wave, are as follows: 59.94% (Wave 2), 96.83% (Wave 3), 95.35% (Wave 4), 97.82% (Wave 5), and 69.53% (Wave 6). The lower retention rate in the final wave can be attributed to the longer time interval between Waves 5 and 6.

CMWS included questions about the social impacts of COVID-19. Starting from Wave 2, it also inquired about favorability toward the US. Our research focuses on respondents who answered the favorability question (N=5,403 at Wave 2; N=5,232 at Wave 3; N=4,989 at Wave 4; N=4,880 at Wave 5; N=3,393 at Wave 6). We weight data from each of the five waves (Waves 2–6) to obtain a snapshot of representative public opinion at that time and track the dynamics of representative public opinion over time. More details about weighting are provided in Supplementary Materials 4.

The CMWS questionnaire measures Chinese favorability toward the US with the following question: “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the United States?” The four options are: Very favorable (1); Somewhat favorable (2); Somewhat unfavorable (3); Very unfavorable (4). We recorded the answers so that 0 indicates “very unfavorable” and 3 indicates “very favorable.”



The CMWS also asked respondents about their demographic information at the ending part, including age, sex, education level, etc. The relevant section of the CMWS questionnaire is presented in Supplementary Materials 8 (translated into English) and Supplementary Materials 9 (in original Chinese). The survey data, along with the questionnaire, are accessible at Princeton DataSpace (<https://doi.org/10.34770/ew2y-jy92>) and Yu Xie's website (<https://yuxie.scholar.princeton.edu/share-files/data-files-declining-chinese-attitudes-toward-united-states-amidst-covid-19>).

### **Supplementary Materials 3: SLC Survey Data**

The third dataset that we use in Study 1 is the Survey on Living Conditions (SLC), an online cross-sectional survey launched in March 2023, coinciding with a shift in China's pandemic policy from "zero-COVID" to "opening up." As for CMWS, this survey was also conducted by the Population Development Studies Center at Renmin University of China. The design and implementation of SLC were similar to those of CMWS in terms of quotas, sampling, and data quality control, and fieldwork was conducted by the same survey firm. However, SLC was intended to be nationally representative, without oversampling residents of Hubei and Beijing. More details about weighting are provided in Supplementary Materials 4.

The focus of this survey is on the living conditions of Chinese people during the period of shifting epidemic control policies. Our study analyzes the 2,592 individuals who answered the question about their favorability toward the US.

The SLC questionnaire measures Chinese favorability toward the US with the following question: "Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the United States?" The four possible answers are: Very favorable (1); Somewhat favorable (2); Somewhat unfavorable (3); Very unfavorable (4). Again, for consistency, we recorded the answers so that 0 indicates "very unfavorable" and 3 indicates "very favorable."

The SLC questionnaire also asked the respondents about their demographic background at the ending part, including age, sex, education level, etc. The relevant section of the SLC questionnaire is presented in Supplementary Materials 8

(translated into English) and Supplementary Materials 9 (in original Chinese). The survey data, along with the questionnaire, are accessible at Princeton DataSpace (<https://doi.org/10.34770/ew2y-jy92>) and Yu Xie's website (<https://yuxie.scholar.princeton.edu/share-files/data-files-declining-chinese-attitudes-toward-united-states-amidst-covid-19>).

#### **Supplementary Materials 4: The Trends of Chinese Favorability toward the US**

All three surveys (SAQURR, CMWS, and SLC) included the same question: “Do you like the US?” In SAQURR, similar questions about favorability toward China, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Pakistan, and Tanzania were also included to provide reference points for assessing attitudes toward the US. For all these favorability questions, respondents may choose one from the four possible answers: “very favorable,” “somewhat favorable,” “somewhat unfavorable,” and “very unfavorable.” These answers are recoded to range from 0 to 3, with a higher score indicating a more favorable opinion. This survey item has been widely used in reports and studies focusing on Americans’ favorability toward China (4–6).

#### Survey Weights

We calculate the mean score and the 95% confidence interval for this survey item at each time point across the three surveys to describe the trends in favorability toward the US. To mitigate potential sampling biases, we apply weights to the scores in each survey based on the most recent 2020 census data, considering factors such as sex, age, and educational levels. Sex was classified into two categories: male and female. Age was grouped into five categories: 18-29 years old, 30-39 years old, 40-49 years old, 50-59 years old, and 60 years old or above. Education was coded into five levels: less than junior high, junior high school, high school, junior college, and BA or higher.

We derived the weights in the following steps. First, we generated a sex-age-educational level (SAE) code and merged our survey samples according to the SAE code. Second, we fitted a Poisson regression model to the survey data in which the dependent variable was the sample size in each SAE category and the independent variables were dummy variables for sex, age, and educational levels. Based on the Poisson model, we calculated the predicted sample quantity in each SAE category and divided it by the total sample size to obtain the proportion of sample quantity in each SAE category. Third, we calculated the proportion of population quantity for each SAE category based on China's 2020 Census. Finally, we divided the proportion of population quantity by the proportion of sample quantity for each SAE category to obtain our weights.

As shown in Table S2, weighting helps address the potential issue of online survey samples being skewed towards a younger demographic with higher educational levels and thus enhances national representativeness. This approach also improves the comparability of scores from different sources which may have varying demographic structures.

Table S2. Demographic Compositions Before and After Weighting for SAQURR, CMWS, and SLC

	SAQURR Dec. 2019–Apr. 2020	CMWS Jun.-Jul. 2020	CMWS Nov.- Dec. 2020	CMWS Apr.- May 2021	CMWS Oct.- Dec. 2021	CMWS Aug.- Oct. 2022	SLC Mar. 2023
<b>Unweighted</b>							
<b>Sex</b>							
Male (%)	48.8	50.0	49.6	50.1	49.8	47.9	50.2
<b>Age</b>							
18–29 (%)	28.2	48.3	47.6	47.2	46.6	44.9	30.0
30–39 (%)	22.8	34.0	34.9	35.0	35.6	35.6	26.4
40–49 (%)	16.3	11.3	11.0	11.2	11.3	12.4	26.5
50+ (%)	32.6	6.4	6.5	6.7	6.6	7.2	17.2
<b>Education Level</b>							
Less than high school (%)	35.3	4.7	4.7	4.3	4.4	3.7	22.5
High school (%)	29.8	17.0	16.4	15.9	16.5	15.4	26.3
Junior college (%)	17.5	23.3	24.2	24.3	24.0	23.9	17.4
BA or higher (%)	17.4	55.0	54.8	55.5	55.1	57.0	33.9
<b>Weighted</b>							
<b>Sex</b>							
Male (%)	52.7	49.6	52.5	52.0	55.4	55.0	54.0
<b>Age</b>							
18–29 (%)	20.5	20.9	20.6	19.4	20.1	19.0	20.1
30–39 (%)	17.1	20.6	20.8	18.7	20.7	20.7	20.3
40–49 (%)	17.1	19.0	18.5	18.2	19.8	15.1	18.3
50+ (%)	45.3	39.6	40.1	43.7	39.5	45.2	41.4
<b>Education Level</b>							
Less than high school (%)	59.1	59.5	59.0	61.3	59.0	60.8	59.8
High school (%)	17.7	20.3	20.7	19.5	20.6	19.6	20.2
Junior college (%)	11.7	10.8	10.8	10.2	10.8	10.3	10.6
BA or higher (%)	11.6	9.4	9.5	9.0	9.6	9.3	9.4
N	3,266	5,403	5,232	4,989	4,880	3,393	2,592

### The Favorability Trends Estimated with Restricted Sample of the CMWS

To address the impact of attrition in the longitudinal CMWS data on the trends in attitudes, we also conducted a robustness check by restricting our sample to those who consistently answered the favorability question in all waves from Wave 2 to Wave 6.

This restriction resulted in a sample of 2,463 individuals. We compared estimates from this restricted sample of the CMWS data with results obtained using all valid responses from the CMWS data. Table S3 shows that the trends in favorability remain robust to the alternative sample selection.

Table S3. Mean Favorability Scores toward the US Before and After Restricting the Sample in CMWS

	Wave	Time of interview	Mean favorability scores	Lower bound	Upper bound	N
All valid responses	Wave 2	Jun. – Jul. 2020	0.87	0.85	0.89	5403
	Wave 3	Nov. – Dec. 2020	0.82	0.80	0.84	5232
	Wave 4	Apr. – May 2021	0.70	0.68	0.72	4989
	Wave 5	Oct. – Dec. 2021	0.68	0.66	0.70	4880
	Wave 6	Aug. – Oct. 2022	0.61	0.59	0.64	3393
	Restricted sample	Wave 2	Jun. – Jul. 2020	0.74	0.71	0.77
Wave 3		Nov. – Dec. 2020	0.77	0.74	0.79	2463
Wave 4		Apr. – May 2021	0.58	0.55	0.61	2463
Wave 5		Oct. – Dec. 2021	0.67	0.64	0.70	2463
Wave 6		Aug. – Oct. 2022	0.59	0.56	0.62	2463

Note. Lower and upper bounds refer to those of the 95% confidence intervals.



### The Favorability Trends in Various Demographic Groups

Notably, younger and more educated groups tend to express greater favorability toward the US. Over time, they also demonstrate greater stability in their favorability than other demographic groups. Figure S1 presents the weighted favorability scores toward the US by age group. Notably, cohorts aged 18–29 experienced a smaller decline in favorability toward the US than older cohorts during the pandemic. Similarly, Figure S2 depicts the favorability scores disaggregated by education level, revealing that the decline in favorability toward the US is smaller at higher levels of education.




Fig. S1. Weighted favorability scores toward the US, based on data from three surveys, by age group




Fig. S2. Weighted favorability scores toward the US, based on data from three surveys, by education level

## Supplementary Materials 5: Social Media Data

For Study 2, we collected 53,949,720 posts containing US-related keywords (美国, 灯塔国, 美利坚, 米国, 美帝) from January 1, 2016, to November 28, 2023, on the Chinese social media platform *Weibo*, which is similar to Twitter. This study is exempt from Institutional Review Board approval, as it analyzes social media data in a read-only way without direct interaction with social media users or access to non-public information. While we cannot definitively authenticate the sample's representativeness for the entire Chinese public, its substantial size provides us with a high level of confidence that this dataset encompasses prevalent viewpoints on Chinese social media. Previous research has analyzed similar data from *Weibo* to study Chinese people's attitudes toward the US for an earlier period (7).

We enlisted the assistance of three graduate students to manually annotate a randomly selected sample of 5,000 posts. Each post was labeled with an attitude score on a scale of -2 (most unfavorable), -1 (somewhat unfavorable), 0 (neutral), 1 (somewhat favorable), and 2 (most favorable). In addition, posts were also annotated to determine whether they were relevant and related to attitudes toward the US. Subsequently, we employed fine-tuning on a large language model, BERT, using these annotations for two tasks. The first task involved binary classification to determine whether a *Weibo* post conveyed attitudes toward the US. The second task was a regression model to predict the attitude score. The results showed that the trained

model achieved a high degree of accuracy of 81.5% in identifying relevant *Weibo* posts, and the regression model predicting attitude scores has an  $R^2$  value of 0.46.

To depict trends in attitudes toward the US, we employed a two-stage averaging approach. First, we calculated the average attitude for each user across all their posts on a specific day. Next, we computed the daily attitude by averaging across all users. This methodology minimizes bias toward active users. In practice, we further smoothed the daily data using a 540-day sliding window, effectively filtering out minor fluctuations.

Given the extended observation period, it is crucial to verify whether the observed trend in attitude accurately reflects changes in *Weibo* users' sentiments or merely results from shifts in user compositions. To discern between the effects of changing opinions and changing user compositions, we replicated our analysis on a fixed subset of *Weibo* users. This subset comprises users who were active throughout the observation period from 2019 to 2023.

As our *Weibo* data does not explicitly record user registration and deletion dates (in fact, many users never delete their accounts when leaving a platform; instead, they just become inactive silently), we identified this subset using two criteria: (a) the user must have posted at least once before 2019, regardless of content, and (b) the user must have posted at least once in the final 12 months of our data (throughout 2023). This subset, totaling 20 million users, represents a small fraction (11.02%) of the total 185 million users who posted during 2019-2023.

Remarkably, the subset exhibited the same trend as the entire user pool, with a long-term decline followed by a recent rebound. Although the subset displayed slightly more positive sentiment compared to the overall user pool, which reflects the varying compositions, the difference is marginal relative to the significant changes in attitudes. This supports our assertion that the reported decline-rebound trend primarily reflects changing attitudes among *Weibo* users rather than shifts in user compositions.




Fig. S3. Attitude toward the US, collected from all *Weibo* users (solid) and a subset that registered before 2019 and kept active till 2023 (dotted).

## **Supplementary Materials 6: Detailed Information for Study 4**

### CFPS Data

The China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), conducted by Peking University, is a nearly nationally representative, longitudinal, comprehensive, and biennial social survey conducted in China (8). In the baseline wave, conducted in 2010, CFPS successfully interviewed 33,600 adults and 8,990 children out of the 57,155 eligible family members from 14,960 contacted households residing in 25 provinces in mainland China (excluding Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Hainan). Since then, CFPS has followed up with the core CFPS members and their children in the subsequent waves. In Study 4, our main analysis uses data from the 2018 and 2020 waves of CFPS. As a supplementary analysis, we used five waves of the CFPS (2012-2020) to document the dynamics of Chinese trust in Americans over a longer time span. The question regarding trust in Americans was not asked in the baseline wave (2010).

Deploying mixed interview modes, with telephone or online interviews supplementing face-to-face interviews, CFPS has maintained reasonably high response and follow-up rates. Specifically, for the two waves of individual-level data we use, the cross-sectional response rates were 67% in 2018 and 66% in 2020. The individual-level adjacent-wave retention rates – the proportion of completed interviews among respondents who completed interviews from the preceding wave,

excluding the deceased – were 80.8% in 2018 and 77% in 2020.<sup>1</sup> The lower response rate and retention rate in 2020 reflect the greater difficulty of conducting telephone interviews, which was the primary mode of data collection for CFPS 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For earlier waves, the individual-level cross-sectional rates were 84.1% (2010), 74.1% (2012), and 72.8% (2014); the adjacent-wave retention rates were 80.6% (2012) and 83.8% (2014).<sup>2</sup>

In Study 4, the outcome of interest is trust in Americans as measured in the 2020 wave of CFPS. Our analysis incorporates data from the 2018 wave, including the baseline measurement of trust in Americans, demographic variables, and location details (province). We initially confined the sample to respondents who indicated their level of trust in Americans in both the 2018 and 2020 waves (N=17,497) and used this sample for descriptive purposes. For instance, we found that the average trust in Americans decreased from 2.64 to 1.87 on a numerical scale of 0–10 between the two waves.

Using a slightly different sample that includes all respondents aged 16 or above in each of the five waves of the CFPS (2012-2020), Table S4 shows that the decline of Chinese trust in Americans from 2018 to 2020 is substantial compared to

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<sup>1</sup> The response rate and adjacent-wave rate for CFPS 2018 are from the *User Guide for CFPS 2018*, available at <https://www.iss.pku.edu.cn/cfps/en/documentation/user/1358165.htm?CSRFT=WN4E-MOBS-IH0H-VCW9-3SEJ-VEHV-MA3U-79WY> (accessed September 10, 2023). The rates for CFPS 2020 are retrieved from the *Progress Report of CFPS 2020*, available at <http://www.iss.pku.edu.cn/cfps/en/news/news1/1355152.htm#:~:text=About%2089%25%20of%20all%20interviews%20were%20completed%20by,66%25%2C%20and%20the%20cross-wave%20response%20rate%20was%2077%25> (accessed September 10, 2023).

<sup>2</sup> CFPS User's Manual (3rd edition), available at <http://www.iss.pku.edu.cn/cfps/en/documentation/user/1292939.htm?CSRFT=WN4E-MOBS-IH0H-VCW9-3SEJ-VEHV-MA3U-79WY> (accessed September 10, 2023).



the earlier dynamics during the past decade. By the measure of weighted average, Chinese trust in Americans continuously and slightly declined from 2012 (2.55) through 2014 (2.38) to 2016 (2.26), followed by a recovery in 2018 (2.67) and a sharp downturn from 2018 to 2020 (1.97). By this measure, the decline (0.7) from 2018 to 2020 is approximately 2.4 times the reduction (0.29) observed during the four years from 2012 to 2016.

Table S4. Chinese Trust in Americans since 2012

Year	Unweighted			Weighted		
	Mean	Lower bound	Upper bound	Mean	Lower bound	Upper bound
2012	2.53	2.50	2.56	2.55	2.51	2.59
2014	2.31	2.28	2.33	2.38	2.34	2.42
2016	2.27	2.24	2.30	2.26	2.22	2.30
2018	2.61	2.58	2.64	2.67	2.63	2.71
2020	1.94	1.91	1.97	1.97	1.92	2.02

Note. This table presents the unweighted and weighted average trust in Americans among respondents aged 16 or above in each wave of the CFPS since 2012 (N=146,238 for the pooled sample). The weighted estimates utilize individual-level cross-sectional weights for the national full sample from each wave of the survey. The lower and upper bounds correspond to the 95% confidence intervals.

In our regression analysis, the central objective is to evaluate the relationship between Chinese people’s level of attention on the US pandemic and their declining trust in Americans. To this end, we limited the sample mentioned above to include only those who reported a trust score above 0 (“complete distrust”) on a numeric scale of 0 to 10 in 2018 (N=11,526). This subset represents individuals whose trust in Americans has the “potential” to decrease. As our regression analysis controlled for province and week fixed effects, we excluded 22 individuals who provided no information on location or interview date, and 74 individuals interviewed in a province or week with fewer than 30 total observations. Our primary analysis was conducted on this restricted sample of 11,430 adults residing in 26 provinces (25 provinces from the baseline survey plus Xinjiang), interviewed at some point over the 23 weeks spanning from July 2020 to December 2020. The descriptive statistics of the sample are given in Table S5.

The CFPS questionnaire measures trust in Americans by asking the following question: Let 0 denote “completely distrust” and 10 indicate “completely trust”.

Please rate your level of trust in the following groups of people: How much do you trust Americans?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Completely distrust										Completely trust

The relevant section of the CFPS questionnaire is presented in Supplementary Materials 8 (translated into English) and Supplementary Materials 9 (in original Chinese). The complete questionnaire (in Chinese) is posted on the CFPS website (<http://www.issp.pku.edu.cn/cfps/wdzz/tewj/index.htm>). The English translation can be found at <https://www.issp.pku.edu.cn/cfps/en/documentation/questionnaires/index.htm>. Details of the CFPS, including its sampling design, quality control, and the calculation of weights, are provided in the CFPS User's Manual (3<sup>rd</sup> edition), available at <https://www.issp.pku.edu.cn/cfps/docs/20220302153803194600.pdf>.

The CFPS data used in this study, along with the public attention measures and COVID-19 cases and deaths in the US (discussed later), has been deposited at Princeton DataSpace (<https://doi.org/10.34770/ew2y-jy92>) and Yu Xie's website (<https://yuxie.scholar.princeton.edu/share-files/data-files-declining-chinese-attitudes-toward-united-states-amidst-covid-19>).

Table S5. Key Variables in the CFPS Sample (N=11,430)

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Trust in Americans (2020)	2.355	2.471	0	10
Baseline trust in Americans	4.000	2.116	1	10
Male	0.489	0.500	0	1
Age	43.188	16.403	16	91
High school or above	0.369	0.482	0	1
Urban <i>hukou</i>	0.282	0.450	0	1
Married	0.758	0.429	0	1
Internet user	0.614	0.487	0	1
Student	0.091	0.288	0	1
Employed	0.721	0.449	0	1

Note. All variables except “Trust in Americans (2020)” were measured in 2018. “High school or above” indicates whether one completed senior high school or a higher level of education. “Student” indicates whether one was still in full-time education, including undergraduate and postgraduate education. “Employed” takes the value of one if an individual was either in full- or part-time paid employment or was self-employed.

## Public Attention Data

We measured the Chinese public's level of attention on the pandemic in the US using the Baidu Index (<https://index.baidu.com/v2/index.html>). Baidu is China's largest search engine. The Baidu Index provides query-based data that reflect the daily intensity of keywords or key phrases entered into Baidu (9-10). We applied a logarithmic transformation to the Baidu Index scores for the following key phrases to quantify public attention.

We used the Chinese key phrase “美国疫情” (“pandemic in the US”) to gauge the level of public attention on the pandemic in the US on a daily basis. We also experimented with the key phrase “美国新冠” (“COVID-19 in the US”). However, the latter exhibited a significantly lower search volume, suggesting that Chinese citizens are more accustomed to using the former phrasing. Consequently, we chose the former for use in the main analysis.

We employed the Chinese term “疫情” (“pandemic”) to measure public attention on the pandemic in general. When Chinese citizens enter this keyword into the Baidu search engine, they may be looking for information about the pandemic in China or in other countries. As most people are perhaps more concerned with the pandemic in their own country than in other countries, the Baidu Index score of this keyword, which does not specify any country, reflects to a greater degree Chinese people's attention on domestic pandemic dynamics. In the placebo test, we use this alternative measure to differentiate between the effects of Chinese people's attention

on the pandemic in the US and those of their attention on the pandemic in general (including in China).

Additionally, we used “中美贸易战” (“China-US trade war”) as the key phrase by which to measure Chinese people’s attention on the China-US trade war. As the trade war may also affect Chinese people’s trust in Americans, we included it in the regression analysis as a comparison with the public attention on the US pandemic.

Finally, we measured public attention on several other salient public events in 2020 for further robustness checks, including the death of George Floyd and the protests it spurred, the development of the extradition case of Meng Wanzhou, and the military presence of the US in the South China Sea. For each event, we experimented with several potential key phrases and chose the one that Chinese citizens most frequently used (i.e., having the highest average Baidu Index score). These selected key phrases were “弗洛伊德” (“Floyd”), “孟晚舟” (“Meng Wanzhou”), and “美国南海” (“US South China Sea”). Similarly, we took a logarithmic transformation of these scores to measure public attention. During our study period, the Baidu Index score of the search about the US presence in the South China Sea had a value of zero for 15 days. We thus added one before the logarithm transformation for this specific variable.

Table S6 provides summary statistics for these public attention variables.

Table S6. Daily Public Attention Measures from Baidu Index (N=157 days)

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Public attention on:				
Pandemic in the US	9.944	0.283	9.390	10.511
Pandemic in general	11.758	0.296	11.203	12.483
China-US trade war	7.404	0.256	6.613	8.085
Meng Wanzhou	9.065	0.580	8.011	10.599
The Floyd case	7.688	0.204	7.164	8.898
US presence in South China Sea	4.444	1.550	0.000	6.764

Note. Public attention measures are the logged values of the Baidu Index scores of each keyword/key phrase.



### COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in the US

We acquired data on the daily numbers of new COVID-19 cases and deaths for the US from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (11). To monitor the dynamics of COVID-19 in the US, we used two measures: the daily number of new confirmed cases and the daily number of deaths for one day before the 2020 CFPS interview date. Due to the time difference between China and the US, these statistics likely correspond to the most up-to-date information available to survey respondents who closely followed US news. We applied a logarithmic transformation to both measures (shown in Table S7).

Table S7. Daily COVID-19 New Cases and Deaths in the US (N=157 days)

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Daily new COVID-19 cases in the US (logged)	11.168	0.591	10.068	12.388
Daily COVID deaths in the US (logged)	6.866	0.504	5.580	8.137

### Full Regression Results

Table S8 reports the complete regression results, a summarized version of which has been presented in the main text as Table 1.

Table S8. Chinese Public Attention on the US Pandemic and Trust in Americans

VARIABLES	Trust in Americans (0–10)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public attention on:				
Pandemic in the US	-0.768*	-0.839*	-0.766*	-0.837*
	(0.323)	(0.331)	(0.321)	(0.329)
China-US trade war			-0.024	-0.025
			(0.115)	(0.115)
Daily new COVID-19 cases in the US (logged)		0.474		0.475
		(0.363)		(0.363)
Daily COVID-19 deaths in the US (logged)		-0.140		-0.141
		(0.101)		(0.101)
Baseline trust in Americans (2018)	0.318***	0.318***	0.319***	0.318***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Male	-0.089	-0.089	-0.089	-0.089
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Age	-0.049***	-0.050***	-0.049***	-0.050***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age squared	0.000**	0.000***	0.000**	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
High school or above	0.360***	0.360***	0.360***	0.360***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Married	-0.180*	-0.180*	-0.180*	-0.180*
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Urban <i>hukou</i>	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Internet user	-0.065	-0.065	-0.065	-0.065
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Student	0.417***	0.418***	0.417***	0.418***
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.107)
Employed	-0.055	-0.055	-0.055	-0.055
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Interviewed at weekend	0.019	-0.007	0.015	-0.011
	(0.069)	(0.082)	(0.069)	(0.082)
Province + week fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430
Adjusted R-squared	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149

Note. The public attention variables are quantified using the logged daily Baidu Index scores for each Chinese keyword or key phrase. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$  (two-tailed test).

### Placebo Tests

As a placebo test, we present in Table S9 additional supporting evidence for the relationship between public attention on the US pandemic and trust in Americans.

Model (1) demonstrates that public attention on the general progression of the pandemic does not have a meaningful impact on trust in Americans. This finding contrasts sharply with the significantly negative coefficient of public attention on the US pandemic, as reported in Table 1 in the main text. Models (2) to (5) reveal that public attention on the US pandemic solely impacts Chinese citizens' trust in Americans, without affecting their trust in parents, neighbors, doctors, or officials. Since the relationship is specific to public attention on the pandemic in the US and trust in Americans, it is unlikely to be driven by alternative cognitive processes beyond the evaluation of Americans/the US.

Table S9. Placebo Tests

VARIABLES	Trust in				
	Americans (1)	Parents (2)	Neighbors (3)	Doctors (4)	Officials (5)
Public attention on:					
Pandemic in the US		0.074 (0.235)	0.213 (0.284)	0.082 (0.303)	0.279 (0.364)
Pandemic in general	-0.194 (0.165)				
Baseline trust (2018)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	11,430	11,362	11,422	11,418	11,378
Adjusted R-squared	0.149	0.139	0.193	0.180	0.190

Note. Public attention on the general progression of the pandemic is quantified using the logged daily Baidu Index scores for the keyword “pandemic” in Chinese, without referring to a specific country. As in Table S8, all models control for the values of dependent variables from the previous wave (2018), individual-level covariates (gender, age, age squared, high school completion, marital status, urban *hukou*, internet user, enrollment status in full-time education, employment status, and whether one was interviewed on the weekend), and include province- and week-fixed effects, with their coefficients not shown. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$  (two-tailed test).

### Additional Analyses

To guard against specification issues that may have accounted for our main results presented in Table 1, we conducted a number of robustness analyses. We present some of them below.

Table S10 presents the results from sensitivity tests that consider the influence of public attention on alternative salient events in 2020, including the death of George Floyd, the extradition case of Meng Wanzhou, and the military presence of the US in the South China Sea. The measures of public attention on these events have been discussed above, with their summary statistics presented in Table S6. Public attention to these events does not have a significant impact on trust in Americans while the estimated effect of public attention to the pandemic in the US remains qualitatively unchanged by including these additional variables.

Table S10. Chinese Public Attention on Alternative Events and Trust in Americans

VARIABLES	Trust in Americans (0-10)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Public attention on:						
Pandemic in the US	-0.766*	-0.767*	-0.683*	-0.744*	-0.678*	-0.745*
	(0.321)	(0.323)	(0.308)	(0.329)	(0.319)	(0.332)
China-US trade war	-0.024				0.001	-0.002
	(0.115)				(0.124)	(0.124)
Meng Wanzhou		-0.063			-0.056	-0.049
		(0.037)			(0.043)	(0.048)
The Floyd Case			0.112		0.098	0.101
			(0.097)		(0.099)	(0.100)
US presence in South China Sea				-0.015	-0.010	-0.012
				(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Daily new COVID-19 cases in the US (logged)						0.454
						(0.370)
Daily COVID-19 deaths in the US (logged)						-0.131
						(0.106)
Baseline trust in Americans (2018)	0.319***	0.318***	0.318***	0.319***	0.318***	0.318***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Observations	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430
Adjusted R-squared	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149

Note. The public attention variables are quantified using the logged daily Baidu Index scores for each Chinese keyword or key phrase, which are presented and discussed in Table S6. As in Table S8, all models control for the values of dependent variables from the previous wave (2018), individual-level covariates (gender, age, age squared, high school completion, marital status, urban *hukou*, internet user, enrollment status in full-time education, employment status, and whether one was interviewed on the weekend), and include province- and week-fixed effects, with their coefficients not shown. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$  (two-tailed test).



Table S11 reproduces the findings of Table 1 from the main text, with the covariates being added one at a time to mitigate possible multicollinearity. In models (1), (3), and (5), none of the three daily-level variables (daily new COVID-19 cases and deaths in the US and public attention on the China-US trade war) significantly affect Chinese citizens' trust in Americans. Notably, the primary variable of interest, public attention on the US pandemic, consistently maintains its significance in models (2), (4), and (6), aligning with the results presented in Table 1.

Table S11. Alternative Model Estimation with Covariates

VARIABLES	Trust in Americans					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Public attention on:						
Pandemic in the US		-0.853*		-0.770*		-0.766*
		(0.335)		(0.312)		(0.321)
China-US trade war					-0.030	-0.024
					(0.115)	(0.115)
Daily new COVID-19 cases in the US (logged)	0.091	0.173				
	(0.233)	(0.241)				
Daily COVID-19 deaths in the US (logged)			-0.023	0.002		
			(0.073)	(0.073)		
Baseline trust in Americans (2018)	0.319***	0.318***	0.319***	0.318***	0.319***	0.319***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Observations	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430
Adjusted R-squared	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149

Note. The estimations additionally adjust for individual-level covariates (gender, age, age squared, high school completion, marital status, urban *hukou*, internet user, enrollment status in full-time education, employment status, and whether one was interviewed on the weekend), and include province- and week-fixed effects, although their coefficients are not shown here to save space. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

In Table S12, we replicate the results from column (1) in Table 1, but we now measure public attention to the US pandemic using various lagged values of the Baidu Index score. Additionally, leading values are introduced as a check; future public attention should not affect current public trust in Americans. The findings reveal that only the Baidu Index score for the same day significantly influences public trust in Americans (column [4]). In contrast, other lagged or leading values do not have a substantial impact. This suggests that Chinese citizens are most responsive to the most current information environment.

Table S12. Estimating the Effects of Lagged and Leading Public Attention to the US Pandemic on Trust in Americans

Public attention on pandemic in the US	Trust in Americans							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
t-3	0.476 (0.434)							0.515 (0.446)
t-2		-0.015 (0.361)						-0.287 (0.400)
t-1			0.633 (0.391)					0.833 (0.441)
t				-0.768* (0.323)				-0.851* (0.320)
t+1					-0.420 (0.448)			-0.220 (0.456)
t+2						0.171 (0.408)		0.406 (0.472)
t+3							-0.193 (0.448)	-0.230 (0.439)
Observations	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430
Adjusted R-squared	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.149

Note. Public attention to the pandemic in the US is the logged Baidu Index score of the key phrase “pandemic in the US” (in Chinese) with the lags or leads indicated at the left. For instance, t-1 means the public attention variable is measured with the logged Baidu Index score one day before the interview. The estimations also control for baseline trust in Americans (2018), individual-level covariates (gender, age, age squared, high school completion, marital status, urban *hukou*, internet user, enrollment status in full-time education, employment status, and whether one was interviewed on the weekend), and include province- and week-fixed effects, although the coefficients are not shown here to save space. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

In Table S13, we restrict the analytical sample in various ways to demonstrate the robustness of the findings in Table 1 from the main text. In models (1) and (2), we re-estimate the regression coefficients using only days with 15 interviews or more. By focusing on these more regular fieldwork days, this restricted sample ensures a larger number of observations on each day – the level at which our key independent variables vary. In models (3) and (4), we include only respondents who were 70 or younger in 2018. Younger respondents are typically more accustomed to telephone interviews, which was the primary interview mode of the CFPS in 2020. Across these models, the findings are consistent with Table 1. Moreover, the coefficients of public attention to the US pandemic in models (2) and (4) are even larger than that in column (4) of Table 1.

Table S13. Estimation with Restricted Samples

VARIABLES	Trust in Americans			
	Excluding dates with fewer than 15 interviews		Excluding respondents older than 70	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public attention on:				
Pandemic in the US	-0.738* (0.338)	-0.857* (0.321)	-0.908** (0.316)	-1.003** (0.306)
China-US trade war		-0.017 (0.111)		0.011 (0.108)
Daily new COVID-19 cases in the US (logged)		0.510 (0.394)		0.412 (0.351)
Daily COVID-19 deaths in the US (logged)		-0.123 (0.101)		-0.096 (0.108)
Baseline trust in Americans (2018)	0.315*** (0.020)	0.315*** (0.020)	0.322*** (0.021)	0.322*** (0.021)
Observations	10,791	10,791	10,869	10,869
Adjusted R-squared	0.148	0.148	0.155	0.155

Note. We use restricted samples as indicated at the top of the columns for estimation. The estimations additionally control for individual-level covariates (gender, age, age squared, high school completion, marital status, urban *hukou*, internet user, enrollment status in full-time education, employment status, and whether one was interviewed on the weekend), and include province- and week-fixed effects, although their coefficients are not shown here to save space. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$  (two-tailed test).

Our main analysis has treated trust in Americans as a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 10. By modeling the outcome measure as ordinal, models (1) and (2) in Table S14 substantiate the results reported in Table 1. The coefficient estimates of public attention to the US pandemic are statistically significant and negative in the ordered logistic regressions. In models (3) and (4), we created a binary variable to indicate whether an individual's trust in Americans increased between the two survey waves and estimated the effect of public attention on the US pandemic using logistic regressions. The results suggest that a higher level of public attention to the US pandemic is associated with a reduced likelihood that respondents reported a higher level of trust in Americans in 2020 compared to their answers in 2018. This finding is also consistent with Table 1.

Table S14. Estimated Effects of Public Attention to US Pandemic in Ordered Logistic and Logistic Regressions

VARIABLES	Trust in Americans in 2020 (Ordinal)		Increased trust in Americans (Binary)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Public attention to:				
Pandemic in the US	-0.609*	-0.664*	-0.813*	-0.846*
	(0.271)	(0.295)	(0.412)	(0.370)
China-US trade war		-0.019		0.136
		(0.084)		(0.122)
Daily new COVID-19 cases in the US (logged)		0.392		0.507
		(0.284)		(0.472)
Daily COVID-19 deaths in the US (logged)		-0.117		-0.195
		(0.078)		(0.141)
Baseline trust in Americans (2018)	0.245***	0.245***	-0.384***	-0.384***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Observations	11,430	11,430	11,430	11,430

Note. Models (1) and (2), treating trust in Americans as ordinal, report coefficient estimates from ordered logistic regressions. Models (3) and (4) report coefficient estimates from logistic regressions where the binary dependent variable takes the value of 1 if one's trust in Americans increased from 2018 to 2020 and 0 otherwise. The estimations additionally account for individual-level covariates (gender, age, age squared, high school completion, marital status, urban *hukou*, internet user, enrollment status in full-time education, employment status, and whether one was interviewed on the weekend), and include province- and week-fixed effects, although their coefficients are not shown here to save space. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed test).



## **Supplementary Materials 7: Summary of Data**

Table S13 provides a summary of all five datasets used in the four studies, including the organization names, sample coverage, sample sizes, and measures.

Table S15. Measurements of Attitudes toward the US and Datasets

Attitude measures	Data source	Period	Data type	Data collection agency	Coverage	Sample size (at baseline)	Data collection method
Trust	China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 2018 and 2020	Jun. 2018 – May 2019 Jul. – Dec. 2020	Longitudinal survey	Institute of Social Science, Peking University	26 provinces of mainland China (excluding Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Hainan, Ningxia, Qinghai)	17,497 <sup>a</sup>	Face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews
Favorability	COVID-19 Multi-Wave Study (CMWS)	Jun. – Jul. 2020 Nov. – Dec. 2020 Apr. – May 2021 Oct. – Dec. 2021 Aug. – Oct. 2022	Longitudinal survey	Population Development Studies Center, Renmin University of China	All 31 provinces of mainland China	5,403	Online interviews
Favorability	Survey on Living Conditions (SLC)	Mar. 2023	Cross-sectional survey			2,596	Online interviews
Favorability	Social Attitudes Questionnaire of Urban and Rural Residents (SAQURR)	Dec. 2019	Cross-sectional survey	Institute of Psychology of Chinese Academy of Sciences	5 provinces representative of Northeast, Northwest, and South China	2,508	Face-to-face interviews
		Apr. 2020 <sup>b</sup>			2 provinces representative of Northwest China	900	Face-to-face interviews
Favorability	<i>Weibo</i>	2016–2023	Social media	Sina Corp.	All China	53,949,720	<i>Weibo</i> official API

Note. **a.** We only included adult respondents who reported trust in Americans in both waves of the CFPS. **b.** Data collection started in December 2019 but was paused from late January to March 2020 due to COVID-19. By the suspension, data collection in Northeast and South China was complete, but only 46% was finished in Northwest China. The remaining data collection was resumed and completed in April 2020.

## Supplementary Materials 8: Translated Survey Questionnaires

### **8.1 Social Attitudes Questionnaire of Urban and Rural Residents (SAQURR)**

**F1.** Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the following countries or regions? [The order of countries/regions is randomized.]

	Very unfavorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Somewhat favorable	Very favorable
F11 The US	1	2	3	4
F12 India	1	2	3	4
F13 Japan	1	2	3	4
F14 Germany	1	2	3	4
F15 Tanzania [An African country]	1	2	3	4
F16 Pakistan	1	2	3	4
F17 China	1	2	3	4
F18 Hong Kong (China)	1	2	3	4

**G1** Your sex:

1. Male
2. Female

**G2** Your age: \_\_\_ years old

**G3** Your education level:

1. Illiterate
2. Primary school
3. Junior high school
4. High school
5. Vocational school
6. Junior college
7. Bachelor's degree
8. Master's degree
9. Doctorate

## **8.2 COVID-19 Multi-Wave Study (CMWS)**

### **Baseline Wave:**

**A2.** What is your sex?

1. Male
2. Female

**A4.** What is your current highest level of education?

1. Elementary school or less
2. Junior high school
3. High school (including secondary vocational and technical school)
4. Junior college
5. Bachelor's degree
6. Master's degree or higher

### **Wave 3-6:**

**F14.** Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the United States?

1. Very favorable
2. Somewhat favorable
3. Somewhat unfavorable
4. Very unfavorable

**G0.** Your year of birth is \_\_\_\_\_ (Please fill in the complete four-digit year)

### **8.3 Survey on Living Conditions (SLC)**

**A2.** What is your sex?

1. Male
2. Female

**A4.** What is your current highest level of education?

1. Elementary school or less
2. Junior high school
3. High school (including secondary vocational and technical school)
4. Junior college
5. Bachelor's degree
6. Master's degree or higher

**F14.** Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the United States?

1. Very favorable
2. Somewhat favorable
3. Somewhat unfavorable
4. Very unfavorable

**G0.** Your year of birth is \_\_\_\_\_ (Please fill in the complete four-digit year)

#### **8.4 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 2018**

**A001** What is your date of birth?

**A002** “Gender of interviewee”? [Interviewer records interviewee’s gender.]

1. Male 5. Female

**A301** Your current household registration type is:

1. Agricultural

3. Non-Agricultural

5. Not registered

79. Not applicable

**C1** Are you currently attending school?

1. Yes 5.No

**C2** Are you currently attending school but on vacation between semesters

1. Yes 5. No

**C4** Are you a full-time or part-time student now/in the last semester?

1. Full-time 5. Part-time

**W01** What is the highest level of education you have obtained?

0. Illiterate/Semi-literate

3. Primary school

4. Junior high school

5. Senior high school/secondary school/technical school/vocational senior school

6. 3- year college

7. 4-year college

8. Master’s program

9. Doctoral program

10. Never been to School

**EA0** What is your current marital status?

1. Never married
2. Married (having a spouse)
3. Cohabitation
4. Divorced
5. Widowed

**GB1** Including agricultural work, waged jobs, self-employment, and private business (housework and unpaid help do not count), have you worked for at least one hour last week?

1. Yes 5. No

**GB2** Is it true that you have a job but are currently on temporary vacation, sick leave, other vacation, or on-the-job training?

1. Yes 5. No

**GB201** Will you return to the job position mentioned above at a definite time point or within six months?

1. Yes 5. No

**GB3** Are you running your own business, which is currently in the off-season but will resume after a while?

1. Yes 5. No

**GB4** Is your agricultural work (including cropping, managing orchards, collecting agricultural and forestry products, fish farming, fishing, raising livestock, selling agricultural products in the market, etc.) in an off-season?

1. Yes 5. No

**U201** Do you use mobile devices, e.g. mobile phones or tablets, to access the Internet?

1. Yes 5. No

**U202** Do you use a computer to access the Internet?

1. Yes 5. No

**N1002** Let 0 denote “completely distrust,” and 10 indicate “completely trust.”

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Completely distrust										Completely trust

Please rate your level of trust in the following groups of people:

**N10021** How much do you trust parents?

**N10022** How much do you trust neighbors?

**N10023** How much do you trust Americans?

**N10024** How much do you trust strangers?

**N10025** How much do you trust local officials?

**N10026** How much do you trust doctors?



### **8.5 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 2020**

**N1002** Let 0 denote “completely distrust,” and 10 indicate “completely trust.” Please rate your level of trust in the following groups of people:

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Completely distrust										Completely trust

**N10021** How much do you trust parents?

**N10022** How much do you trust neighbors?

**N10023** How much do you trust Americans?

**N10024** How much do you trust strangers?

**N10025** How much do you trust local officials?

**N10026** How much do you trust doctors?

## Supplementary Materials 9: Chinese Survey Questionnaires

### 9.1 城乡居民社会态度问卷 (SAQURR)

F1. 您是否喜欢以下国家或地区？（国家/地区的顺序随机排序）

	非常 不喜欢	不太 喜欢	比较 喜欢	非常 喜欢
美国	1	2	3	4
印度	1	2	3	4
日本	1	2	3	4
德国	1	2	3	4
坦桑尼亚【非洲国家】	1	2	3	4
巴基斯坦	1	2	3	4
中国	1	2	3	4
中国香港	1	2	3	4

G1. 您的性别：

1. 男 2. 女

G2. 您的年龄：      岁

G3. 您的教育程度

1. 不识字

2. 小学

3. 初中

4. 高中

5. 中专

6. 大学专科

7. 大学本科

8. 硕士

9. 博士

## **9.2 新冠疫情期间居民生活状况调查 (CMWS)**

### **基线调查问卷:**

**A2.** 您的性别是:

1. 男
2. 女

**A4.** 您目前的最高受教育程度是:

1. 小学及以下
2. 初中
3. 高中 (包括中专和技校)
4. 大学专科
5. 大学本科
6. 硕士研究生及以上

### **第三期追访-第六期追访:**

**F14.** 您是否喜欢美国? [单选题]

1. 非常喜欢
2. 比较喜欢
3. 比较不喜欢
4. 非常不喜欢

**G0.** 您的出生年份是: \_\_\_\_\_ (请填写完整四位数年份)

### **9.3 居民生活状况调查**

**A2.** 您的性别是：

1. 男
2. 女

**A3.** 您的年龄是：

1. 小于 18 岁
2. 18-24 岁
3. 25-29 岁
4. 30-39 岁
5. 40 岁及以上

**A4.** 您目前的最高受教育程度是：

1. 小学及以下
2. 初中
3. 高中（包括中专和技校）
4. 大学专科
5. 大学本科
6. 硕士研究生及以上

**F14.** 您是否喜欢美国？ [单选题]

1. 非常喜欢
2. 比较喜欢
3. 比较不喜欢
4. 非常不喜欢

**G0.** 您的出生年份是：（请填写完整四位数年份）

\_\_\_\_\_

#### **9.4 中国家庭追踪调查（CFPS） 2018**

**A001** 请问您的出生日期？

**A002** 记录受访者性别。

1.男性 5.女性

**A301** 您现在的户口状况是：

1. 农业户口

3. 非农户口

5. 没有户口

79. 不适用

**C1** 您现在在上学吗？

1. 是 5. 否

**C2** 是否在上学，但目前正处在学期期间的假期？

1.是 5.否

**C4** 您上学期/目前是全日制学生还是在职学生？

1. 全日制 5. 在职

**W01** 您已完成（毕业）的最高学历是？

0. 文盲/半文盲

3. 小学

4. 初中

5. 高中/中专/技校/职高

6. 大专

7. 大学本科

8. 硕士

9. 博士

10. 从未上过学

**EA0** 请问您当前的婚姻状态是：

1. 未婚
2. 有配偶（在婚）
3. 同居
4. 离婚
5. 丧偶

**GB1** 过去一周您是否至少工作了 1 个小时？（农业工作、挣工资的工作、个体/私营经济活动都算工作，但不包括在家作家务和义务的志愿劳动。）

1. 是 5. 否

**GB2** 您是不是有工作但是目前正处在临时放假、休病假或其他假期中，或正在在职上学/培训？

- 1.是 5.否

**GB201** 您能够在确定的时间或者 6 个月以内，回到原来的工作岗位么？

- 1.是 5.否

**GB3** 您是否从事个体经营活动，但是目前处于生意淡季，等过一段时间还会继续经营？

- 1.是 5.否

**GB4** 您是否从事农业方面的工作但是目前处于农闲季节？农业工作包括种地、管理果树、采集农林产品、养鱼、打渔、养牲畜以及去市场销售农产品等。

- 1.是 5.否

**U201** 您是否使用移动设备，比如手机、平板，上网？

1. 是 5.否

**U202** 您是否使用电脑上网？

1.是 5.否

**N1002** 若 0 分代表非常不信任，10 分代表非常信任，请您对以下这几类人的信任程度打分。

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
非常不信任										非常信任

**N10021** 您对父母的信任程度能打几分？

**N10022** 您对邻居的信任程度能打几分？

**N10023** 您对美国人的信任程度能打几分？

**N10024** 您对陌生人的信任程度能打几分？

**N10025** 您对本地政府官员的信任程度能打几分？

**N10026** 您对医生的信任程度能打几分？

### **9.5 中国家庭追踪调查（CFPS）2020**

**N1002** 若 0 分代表非常不信任，10 分代表非常信任，请您对以下这几类人的信任程度打分。

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
非常不信任										非常信任

**N10021** 您对父母的信任程度能打几分？

**N10022** 您对邻居的信任程度能打几分？

**N10023** 您对美国人的信任程度能打几分？

**N10024** 您对陌生人的信任程度能打几分？

**N10025** 您对本地政府官员的信任程度能打几分？

**N10026** 您对医生的信任程度能打几分？



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